METAPHYSICS AND LAW
Roy L. STONE-DE

MONTPENSIER*

The dichotomy between questions of fact and questions of law
serves as a starting point Jbr the Jbllowing discussion of the nature
of legal reasoning. In the course of the dialogue the author notes
similaritiesand dissimilaritiesbetween legal reasoningand philosophical and mathematical reasoning. In the end we are left with a clearer
insight into the distinctivefeatures of the adjudicativeprocess.

Enter a Metaphysician, a Wrangler, a Physicist, and a Law
Student.

Metaphysician: I am concerned with the remarks of the Student
of the common law over the question of axioms and questions of
fact. I shall put it this way. (I) A man V says of a bird "It is a
swan." The bird is black. (2) A man V says of a machine "It is a
boat" or "This boat was exceeding the speed limit for boats." The
machine does not touch water, it travels ten feet above it. (3) A

man V says of another P "He intended to murder me." The idea
has never entered P's head. Now there is a relation between the
statement (A) "It is a swan" and the statement (B) "A swan need
not be white" which is obvious. In the instance described (A)
cannot be true unless (B) is true. This is less well expressed by
saying that "(A) is true in the circumstances described implies that
(B) is true." Now it must be remembered (A) is not an axiom but
a statement of an actual state of affairs, for it is not a statement as
to what constitutes a swan. Nor is it a statement of the sort "A
thing of sort S I could be of sort S2" or "A thing of sort S I could
not be sort S2." To ,call statements of the sort "This is a swan,"
"This is a boat," "This is an intention to murder," axioms
suggests that these statements are statements which, if true, could
not have been false. But they are not. To call them axioms obscures
that even if they are in fact true, they might have been false. It
obscures the fact that they are concerned with the actual . .

.

. To

say the law is a calculus also obscures the fact. It obscures what I
suggest is the central purpose of law. Lord Atkin's "You must
take reasonable care etc. . .

."

is indeed like an axiom. To point

out the fact that in law undecided questions arise is no proof that it
* Cambridge, England, Barrister-at-Law, Lincoln's Inn.
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is not a calculus, no proof that it has a feature which is not present
in a logical or mathematical calculus, is of the first importance.
However, this should not be so presented as to obscure the fact that
whether or not a question such as "Was there here negligence?"
"Was there here manslaughter?" is a question of law, it is a
question for the courts, and a question in which human beings, the
courts, are seeking to gain a better knowledge of what actually
happened. A procedure of the sort "Isn't this TI?" "Isn't this
T2?" "Isn't this T4?" is appropriate to any statement of the sort
"This too is of kind K" or "This is not of kind K," whether the
statement is a priori or not. It is appropriate to "This is a cow,"
"This is a swan," "This is a sundial," as well as to "Two is a
number." It is appropriate whether the statement is necessary or
not. It is appropriate to "Is this a horse?" when "this" is a
centaur, to "Is this a number?" when "this" is infinite. This
procedure plays a part also for general statements "All K is K2,"
whether a priori or not. It plays a part because these statements depend upon statements of the sort "This is K," "This is K2." The
procedure of parallel cases appropriate to "This is KI" should not
be confused with the inductive procedure "This T1 is K1 and K2,"
"This T2 is K1 and K2," "This T3 is K1 and K2"; so "All KI is
K2," whether the connection between KI and K2 is or is not a
priori.
Wrangler: Certainly we must distinguish between questions of
fact in the philosophic sense and the necessary truths of
mathematics. We must distinguish between questions of law and
questions of fact in the legal sense and questions of fact in the
philosophic sense. It is crucial to comprehend what is contained in
the legal question "Is this murder?" "Is this negligence?" In
setting out the calculus-like nature of law I do not think that the
Student has conflated these matters. It is true that it is difficult to
find the axioms of a legal system. The self-evidence of certain legal
propositions is no guarantee that they are axioms, nor is the
generality of any legal statement. The Student did not suggest that
the question "Is this murder?" or the statement "This is
negligence" was an axiom. He said that the answer to these
questions constituted theorems derived from axioms. This is quite
explicit from the discussion of the limitation to "A and his heirs."
Here are the axioms, "Nullus heres viventis" and "A man can
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have an heir till the end of time." These are not statements of fact
which could have been otherwise but logical possibilities. They are,
in the contemplation of law, necessary truths with the
characteristics and marks of Euclid's postulates and modus ponens.
That these axioms are the product of human minds or the work of
human beings or courts is no more an objection to their axiomatic
nature than when we remember that much geometry was discovered
when man wished to survey the lone and level sands or calculate the
cubic capacity of the pyramids, or that Newton discovered the
infinitesimal calculus to produce the laws of motion, or that the
geometry of tensors and vectors is connected with Einstein's theory
of relativity.
Metaphysician: Yes, this does raise some difficulty about the
philosophic account of matters of fact and logical possibility and
necessity..
Wrangler: Perhaps the habitual dichotomies necessarycontingent, a priori-empirical, analytic-synthetic, do not hold in law
or indeed generally. I wish to suggest that the relationship between
fact and law and law and fact is one of consonance. Lawyers say
that such and such a concept is consonant with the facts, and such
and such a case is consonant with some other case, where there is
no equivalence between the two cases. The casual, not causal or
logical, connection between the facts and the law may best be
described by the term "consonant." Legal truths are thus
consonant and may be compared with a metaphysician's talk of a
reflective non-necessary truth. Shall we examine in greater detail
this question of fact? I want to show that there are aleph facts and
alpha facts at work in a legal system.
Student: Yes. We must distinguish between two senses of fact in
the legal process. And then we must distinguish between questions
of law, matters of law and questions of fact, matters of fact in the
refined and distinct senses of alpha facts and aleph facts. To make
this refined but not too recondite distinction we will first and
foremost consider cases where there is a trial before both judge and
jury. It is almost trite to start with the observation that the judge
decides questions of law and the jury decides questions of fact.
Wrangler: Both aleph and alpha facts?
Student: Yes.
Metaphysician: But what is a question of law for the judge?
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Student: Well, it is expressed often in this form: "Members of
the jury you must take the law from me." It is a rule of law that
"When the ancestor by any gift or conveyance takes an estate of
freehold, and in the same gift or conveyance an estate is limited
either mediately or immediately to his heirs in fee or in tail then
always in such cases the heirs are words of limitation of the estate
and not words of purchase." This is the famous Rule in Shelley's
Case.' Again, "A charitable gift is for one of the following four
purposes: the advancement of religion, the advancement of
education, the relief of poverty and for other purposes beneficial to
the community." Or, finally, "a descent cast tolls the entry into a
right of action ....

"

Metaphysician: I see, and what is an alpha fact?
Student: An alpha fact is one for the decision of the jury, who,
having heard the evidence, decides a certain question such that the
evidence alone is relevant to determine "Was there arsenic in the
remains of the corpus delicti?" "Was the signature of the witness
really the act and deed of the witness or was it a forgery?" "Did
the horse with its rider jump the bales of straw?" "Was there a
snail in the bottle or the decomposed remains thereof in the ginger
beer when the plaintiff drank the same on such and such a day?"
Wrangler: You mean that when it is said that a case was
decided upon the facts or the decision turned upon the facts, those
facts are alpha facts?
Student: Yes. It is appropriate that you use the word decision
turning upon facts and not judgment. These facts are essentially
those facts to which it is appropriate for witnesses to answer, and
which are within the province of induction.
Physicist: I can see that alpha facts are the sorts of facts with
which a .physicist is concerned. It is appropriate that even Popper2
who denies that science is empirical and inductive, but asserts that
it is hypothetical and deductive, nevertheless uses that part of the
law which relates to jury trial as the analogue for scientific
discovery. But what are aleph facts?
Student: Aleph facts are those matters which are left to the
jury. They may be characterized in this sort of address: "Members
of the jury, it is for you to decide whether on the evidence there
'76 Eng. Rep. 206 (K.B. 1581).
K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DisCOVERY (Eng. ed. 1959).

2
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was a rider and a horse and whether the rider and the horse did as
alleged jump the bales of straw, having found those alpha facts it is
also for you to say whether this constituted negligence, or a breach
of duty to take reasonable care. I have told you what constitutes
negligence and you must decide whether this was negligence,
whether the act complained of constituted negligence."
Wrangler: The jury has to ascribe to the alpha facts a legal
concept and having so ascribed to the alpha facts a legal quality this
is the finding of an aleph fact?
Student: Yes. An example which makes the matter perfectly
clear is contained in this passage from the judgment of Diplock
L.J. in Wooldridge v. Sumner
To treat Lord Atkin's statement 'You must take reasonable care to avoid
acts or omissions which you can reasonably foresee would be likely to injure
your neighbour' as a complete exposition of the law of negligence is. to
mistake aphorism for exegesis. It does not purport to define reasonable care
and was directed to identifying the person to whom the duty to take
reasonable care is owed. What is reasonable care in a particular
circumstance is a jury question and where, as in a case like this, there is no
direct guidance or hindrance from authority it may be answered by
enquiring whether the ordinary reasonable man would say that in all the
circumstances the defendant's conduct was blameworthy!

I think it is important to keep the distinction between alpha facts
and aleph facts clear.
Metaphysician: Why? Is there here any distinction of
philosophical importance?
Student: It draws a distinction between those cases where
experiment, observation, looking, weighing, testing, measuring,
subsequent observation and experiment establish facts empirically,
and those facts which reflection alone reveals. The difference
between "the Wasserman reaction was positive and so the patient
has syphilis" on the one hand and "all the evidence is in, it has
horns and cloven hooves etc. but is it a cow?" or the equestion "Is
this a cow though it is a hermaphrodite?" "A horse though it is a
centaur?" "A number although it is infinite?"
Metaphysician: Quite so. This is the distinction I have just
made.
Student: What I am shewing is that the question of the type
3 [1963] 2 Q.B. 43 (C.A.).
IId. at 66-67.
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which the Metaphysician has raised "Was there here negligence?"
"Was there here manslaughter?" is a question by means of which
human beings are seeking a better grasp of what happened. It is a
jury question, and it is a question of aleph fact. By contrast, let me
give an example of an alpha fact. Imagine that Fats Waller crossexamines Porphyria's lover in Browning's poem. The loyer is
charged with murder. He is asked "Where were you on the night of
June the first?" He makes the following statement:
The rain set early in tonight, the sullen wind was soon awake, it tore the elm
tops down for spite and did its worse to vex the lake. I listened with heart
fit to break when glided in Porphyria. Straight she shut the cold out and the
storm and kneeled and made the cheerless grate blaze up and all the cottage
warm . . . and last she sat down by my side and called me. When no voice

replied she put my arm about her waist and made her smooth white
shoulder bare and all her yellow hair displaced, and stooping made my
cheek lie there and spread o'er all her yellow hair, murmuring how she loved
me-she too weak for all her heart's endeavour to set its struggling passion
free from pride and vainer ties dissever . . . . Surprise made my heart swell
and still it grew while I debated what to do . . . . I found a thing to do and
all her hair in one long yellow string I wound three times her little throat
around and strangled her.5

Stopping there we find a confession that he strangled her. The
question for the moment is not that he murdered her which would
be the answer to an aleph question but that he strangled her-an
alpha question. Whether strangling constitutes murder in the
circumstances is a jury question to be decided upon the law after
the judge has directed the jury as to the nature of murder, say
Coke's definition: "Where a person of sound memory and
discretion-unlawfully killeth any reasonable creature in
being-and under the King's peace-with malice aforethought,
either express or implied."
I want to suggest that Popper's account of trial by jury does
not fully identify two questions for the jury, though he does well to
see that there is a difference between judgment by judges and
verdicts by juries. However he conflates alpha and aleph facts and
so does not draw the distinction between facts of which empirical
evidence sufficed to shew that they happened, occurred or existed
and facts where there is need for reflection, interpretation and a
conceptual scheme in which they rest.
5Browning, Porphyria'sLover, in
Buckley & G. Woods 1965).

POETRY OF THE VICTORIAN PERIOD

177-78 (3d ed. J.
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Physicist: Let us look at what Popper actually says:
The verdict of the jury (vere dictum-spoken truly), like that of the
experimenter, is an answer to a question of fact (quidfacth?) which must be
put to the jury in the sharpest, the most definite form. But what question is
asked, and how it is put, will depend very largely on the legal situation, i.e.

on the prevailing system of criminal law (corresponding to a system of
theories). By its decision, the jury accepts, by agreement, a statement about
a factual occurrence-a basic statement, as it were. The significance of this
decision lies in the fact that from it, together with the universal statements
of the system (of criminal law) certain consequences can be deduced. In
other words, the decision forms the basis for the application of the system;
the verdict plays the part of a 'true statement of fact.' But it is clear that
the statement need not be true merely because the jury has accepted it. This
fact is acknowledged in the rule allowing a verdict to be quashed or revised.
The verdict is reached in accordance with a procedure which is governed
by rules. These rules are based on certain fundamental principles which are
chiefly, if not solely, designed to result in the discovery of objective truth.
They sometimes leave room not only for subjective convictions but even for
subjective bias. Yet even if we disregard these special aspects of the older
procedure and imagine a procedure based solely on the aim of promoting
the discovery of objective truth, it would still be the case that the verdict of
the jury never justifies, or gives grounds for, the truth of what it asserts.
In contrast to the verdict of the jury, the judgment of the judge is
'reason': it needs, and contains, a justification. The judge tries to justify it
by, or deduce it logically from, other statements: the statements of the legal
system, combined with the verdict that plays the role of initial conditions.
This is why the judgment may be challenged on logical grounds. The
Jury's decision, on the other hand, can only be challenged by questioning
whether it has been reached in accordance with the accepted rules of
procedure: i.e. formally, but not as to its content. (A justification of the content of a decision is significantly called a 'motivated report,' rather than a
'logically justified report.')
The analogy between this procedure and that by which we decide basic
statements is clear. It throws light, for example, upon their relativity, and
the way in which they depend upon questions raised by the theory. In the
case of the trial by jury, it would be clearly impossible to apply the 'theory'
unless there is first a verdict arrived at by decisions; yet the verdict has to be
found in a procedure that conforms to, and thus applies, part of the general
legal code. The case is analogous to that of basic statements. Their
acceptance is part of the application of a theoretical system; and it is only
this application which makes any further applications of the theoretical
system possible.6

Student: Yes. Although Popper points out something

illuminating here, he misses the nature of legal proceedings when
I K. POPPER, THE LOGIC OF SCIENTIFIC DISCOVERY 109-11 (Eng. ed. 1959).
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there is a question of fact to be decided. He ignores my trichotomy
alpha facts, aleph facts and questions of law. A decision as to a
matter of aleph facts is itself reasoned in just the same way as a
judgment as to a matter of law is reasoned. When he says that
judgments proceed logically he is saying something important. If he
means that logic means only deductive logic, however, he is
mistaken, for legal judgments proceed paraductively as well as
deductively. And paraduction is also logical. His confusion is
brought out when he says that the causal connections between the
verdicts of juries or their decisions are psychological and not
logical. When a jury has to decide an aleph fact that connection
between decisions and fact is paraductive and is also logical. It is
of course a matter for epistemologists and philosophers of science
to say whether the connections between the existence of the external
world, or the facts of the external world and our knowledge of
them is a logical question.
Metaphysician: Quite so. The traditional moves made in
philosophy bring out this feature. There is a tendency on the part
of philosophers of science who support the hypothetico-deductive
theory to consider that the theories or algorithms govern not
merely the facts but also what are facts. It is quite clear that when
a jury decides questions of alpha facts, it is presented with the
question "What happened?" This is argued in accordance with our
everyday conceptual scheme of those strange philosophical entities
reality, mind, body, will, intention and so on. It is not confronted
with the artificially limited interpretation put by the law which only
comes into operation when the jury's decision concerns aleph facts.
This does not mean to say that alpha facts are themselves free from
philosophical, epistemological or metaphysical overtones.
Student: It is odd that even the hypothetico-deductive theorist
should behave like the empirical and inductive theorist in accepting
that facts are somehow brute, or can exist without cavil or speak
louder than words.
Metaphysician: It is not so odd, for the difference between them
really consists in this-that the hypothetico-deductive theorist seeks
to establish that deduction alone guarantees our knowledge, while
the empirical inductive theorist is concerned to claim that some
principle of verification guarantees our knowledge. We have rid
ourselves of the bondage of this confined view of logic by
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acknowledging that paraduction is also a logic. It is not a
transcendental or intuitive argument, but, as the Student has
pointed out, an explicitly rational procedure.
Student: I am also bringing out the point that a procedure of
the sort "Isn't this T2?" "Isn't this T3?" "Isn't this T4?" is
appropriate to any statement a priori or not, and is appropriate
whether the statement is necessary or not.
Metaphysician: Yes, I see this. Between alpha facts and aleph
facts there is a distinction which is reflected in my suggestion that
the procedure is applicable to generalities such as "All K is K2"
whether a priori or not. It plays a part, as I have said, because
these statements depend upon statements of the sort "This is KI,"
"This is K2." However, the distinction I wish to bring out is this:
that the procedure by parallel cases appropriate to "This is KI"
should not be confused with the inductive procedure "This T1 is
K1 and K2," "This T2 is KI and K2," "This T3 is K1 and K2;"
so "All KI is K2" whether the connection between K1 and K2 is
or is not a priori. This is what I wish to bring out in my distinction
between alpha and aleph facts. There is a tendency to think that the
paraductive argument or the case by case procedure is somehow
inductive because it relates to facts and decisions, whereas it is
concerned with concepts and with non-necessary truths, and is
reflective. There is also a tendency to think that because it is
concerned with concepts and because it is reflective it is appropriate
only to that part of the judicial process or legal cases which is
concerned with questions of fact, and having thus identified the
appropriate procedure I characterize it by saying that juries have
to decide aleph facts. I hope that this will at least make it clear to
the lawyer and jurist how it is that Wisdom can say such a
seemingly shocking thing-that the question "Is this negligence?"
is a question of fact.
Wrangler: Having been impressed with what the Student has
said about the relations between logic, mathematics and law, I
would like to ask whether this diagnosis into matters of law,
matters of aleph facts, and matters of alpha facts affects the
Student's argument with the Doctor of the civil law.
Student: I do not think so for the following reasons. First of
all, I have argued that the law and logic and mathematics rest
ultimately upon paraduction or the case by case procedure. With
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this I trust the Metaphysician will agree. Then I suggested that the
law is like logic and geometry in that certain given axioms could be
propounded or postulated, and in accordance with certain moves,
arguments and functions we could derive theorems from these
axioms. An instance: the thirteenth century interpretation of the
limitation to a donee, "A," being a life in being, "and his heirs."
Another instance is the development by paraduction between the
years in the middle of the fourteenth century down to the late
sixteenth of a series of cases which established the rule of law
known as the Rule in Shelley's Case.7 This seems to me to have
something in common with the establishment of the rules of
inference in logic and the commutative law in mathematics. Then I
suggested that cases subsequent to Shelley's Case fall to be decided
in several ways. Where the rule is applied, the courts use deductions
from premises, that is the Rule in Shelley's Case. Where a case
occurs the Rule may be interpreted, restricted or held not to apply.
The most illuminating cases of this activity occur when we are
dealing with rules of construction as in Wild's Cases or Sibley v.
Perry,9 rather than with rules of law as in Shelley's Case or
Purefoy v. Rogers.10 Insofar as there are areas in which there are
axioms and rules, I suggest that a calculus may be operated by
appropriate deductions. Here the analogy with mathematics and
logic is strong, and may indeed be isomorphic. Where, however, it
still remains appropriate, and this is in the majority of cases, that
paraduction is the proper procedure, nevertheless the calculus-like
nature of the law remains. I also pointed out that in spite of
undecidability problems, logic, mathematics and law all had
consistency principles and all three could establish the consistency
of the system by shewing how consistent a part of the system was.
The law was shewn to be consistent, binding and logical, by
pointing to clusters of cases which were binding, consistent and
logical.
Wrangler: Is the inference to be drawn from this argument this
alarming matter-as metaphysics has affinities and analogies with
law, and as law has affinities and analogies with logic and
mathematics, metaphysical questions like legal questions are like
"76
'77
'32
1"85

Eng. Rep.
Eng. Rep.
Eng. Rep.
Eng. Rep.

206 (K.B. 1581).
277 (K.B. 1599).
211 (Ch. 1802).
1181 (K.B. 1670).
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logical questions? And metaphysical knowledge, logical knowledge
and mathematical knowledge are the same?
Student: I would not say the same. They have family
resemblances which intertwine, criss-cross and interrelate in such a
way that those of us who say that mathematics and logic and law
are knowledge and not nonsense, will say also of metaphysics that
it is knowledge and not nonsense. We shall say that metaphysical
questions are not verbal questions. We will understand that the
problems which arise concerning the foundations of logic,
mathematics and law resemble those foundational questions
concerning metaphysics, epistemology and philosophy. We shall
also be able to say that if mathematical arguments are rational and
mathematical proofs conclusive, legal arguments are rational and
legal proofs conclusive, and so on.
Wrangler: But how does your distinction between questions of
law, and questions of aleph facts work? It seems to me that some
remarks of Einstein are apposite here: "So far as mathematics do
not relate to reality they are certain, and so far as they do relate to
reality they are uncertain." Your question of law seems to me to be
concerned with a purely conceptual matter, whereas your aleph
facts, being a pastiche and melange of alpha facts and law, relate
to reality.
Metaphysician: This worries me too a little. Consider this:
Draw three triangles. This delta is an equal sided triangle and an
equal angled triangle. This delta is an equal sided triangle and an
equal angled triangle and this delta is an equal sided and an equal
angled triangle, so all equal sided triangles are equal angled
triangles. This is a process Johnson called intuitive induction. It is
not argument by parallels. Scientific induction is concerned to
establish a connection between two concepts which are two in the
way cigarette smoking and cancer are two. Logical induction,
mathematical induction and intuitive induction are concerned with
a connection between two concepts which are two in the way equal
sided triangle and equal angled triangle are two. Procedure by
parallels involves only one concept. Does your distinction between
law and aleph facts somehow distinguish between these senses of
induction? I too am mystified for it seems that you are saying that
questions of law, because they are calculus-like, are concerned with
necessary truths in the sense in which it is often said that
mathematical and logical concepts are necessary truths, whereas
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the aleph facts seem more like the account I have given of those
reflective, non-necessary questions of fact.
Student: I think I can answer both the Wrangler and the
Metaphysician at once. My account of the law as a calculus
involves certain artificalities which make it paradoxical to say that
the law is heterodox and ultimate. But this is so. In the law the
precedence of precedents, the hierarchy of authorities, the binding
force of House of Lords decisions, the rules of pleading, the
straight-jacketing features of legal language and definition make
the ratiocination of the law curious and idiosyncratic. For these
reasons law is like mathematics if the account Einstein gave of
mathematics is correct. He said in the Princeton lectures that the
mathematician was concerned to discover whether his theorems and
so on were true insofar as they were derived from certain axioms
and contained by certain arguments and functions; whereas a
physicist was concerned to know whether the truths of his
mathematical theorems corresponded with reality. Now a case is
good law, a rule a good rule, if it is consistent with the rules of law
or cases from which it is derived. Insofar as legal reasoning is not
deductive and like the links of a chain, nor yet inductive and like
the strength and length of a lever, but paraductive and like the legs
of a chair which support a conclusion from certain arguments or
ratiocinations, the truth of a rule or the soundness of a case is
discovered with reference to its consistency within the body of other
rules and cases. This is what Bacon meant when he said that the
law was concerned with de vero et defalso and -not with de hono et
de malo, and this is what I argued vis a vis paraduction and the
proof which supports a conclusion in my discussion with the
Doctor of the civil law.
Doctor: Yes, I recall that Leibnitz too attributes something
similar to the civil law in the Pandects.
Wranger: Are you not saying that the values of a legal logic are
the alethic modes and not deontic or epistemic?
Student: I am saying this, and more. I am suggesting that the
correctness, rightness and truth of legal truths are tested by
reference to the internal consistency of an informal system in the
same way as the truths of mathematics and logic are tested with
reference to the consistency of a formal system. I am also
suggesting that a question of law is settled by operating a calculus.
This operation consists in reflection upon the cases actual and
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possible. It does not consist in the application of law to facts by
the ascribing of certain legal concepts to facts as happens in the
case of aleph factual questions.
Metaphysician: But is it not the case that aleph facts, decisions,
are cases which form part of the calculus in a wider sense from the
sources of law? The theorem, when applied to the alpha facts,
constitutes the aleph facts, and are not these particulars of law,
from which among others are derived the laws of laws, the legum
leges? Does this not amount to the claim that the legal calculus is
itself non-necessary and .concerned with questions of fact which
might have been otherwise?
Student: Yes, it is a theorem derived from axioms. There are
possible cases also.
Metaphysician: Yes, but this removes law from the empirical
inductive procedure of science. This does not place law in the a
priori, necessary, deductive field of the mathematical and logical.
Wrangler: Analogy and induction have a place in mathematics
and this does not take them out of the a priori necessary field.
Physicist: In science we use models and analogies, also
hypotheses and deductions, as well as empiricism and induction.
Student: This brings us fairly and squarely into the sphere of
foundational studies, and foundational studies are the concern of
epistemology, and thus of philosophy.
Wrangler: Before we move into discussions of realism,
intuitionism, finitism, conventionalism, etc., etc., scepticism,
positivism and transcedentalism, we should consider in detail the
use of cases, analogies, models and insomorphism as argument.
Physicist: The Metaphysician has suggested a distinction
between the procedure case by case, or paraduction, with other
sorts of argument from particulars, parallels of cases, induction
and what has been called intuitive induction and mathematical
induction. In science we use analogies and models, pictures,
theories and so on. The logic of scientific discovery and the nature
of scientific explanation both use what philosophers of science call
patterns of argument.
Wrangler: There are mathematicians who claim that in patterns
of plausible reasoning in mathematics too we use analogies and
induction, not mathematical induction either, but simple
induction." They argue that the sorts of arguments that jurymen
and judges may use to come to different conclusions, which support
,"See

G.

POLYA, INDUCTION AND ANALOGY IN MATHEMATICS

(1954).
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but do not entail those conclusions, are analogous to the arguments
used in probability.
Physicist: Yes, they distinguish between induction and plausible
reasoning and we must distinguish between induction and
deduction, physics and mathematics. The Student has brought out
important features in the nature of legal argument by paraduction,
but he has brought out with the distinction between law and fact, and
in the refinement between law, alpha facts, and aleph facts, some
features which are present I think in scientific matters: how, for
example, facts are related to theories, and how theories are
connected with calculi. "Busy old fool unruly sun," "All the rest
the sun goes round," "The sun to me is dark." Are these facts
brute facts, interpreted facts?
Metaphysician: Quite so. Alpha facts are somehow brute facts,
uninterpreted facts: "He strangled her," "He forcibly seduced
her," "The sun is like the bishop's bottom, large and round and
hot." When a philosopher talks of facts and propositions, when he
speaks of reality and the objects of the external world, he does not
think that he is interpreting facts. He says of a question of fact that
it is a question the answer to which if true might have been false and if
false might have been true.
Student: When he says that "Is this negligence?" "Is this
rape?" "Is this murder?" are questions of fact, does not the
philosopher think that here tlere is interpretation or the setting up
of facts in a conceptual scheme? Are these not set in a background
of theory as Popper suggests decisions and verdicts of juries as to
matters of facts are so set in the law? Do you not say that deciding
whether this is negligience is the gain of a better grasp of what
actually happened, the acquisition of a further understanding of the
fact?
Metaphysician: Yes, by reflection and again reflection upon the
cases actual and possible we may obtain a new grasp of what we
did not see before, and this gain is a gain in our knowledge. It is
not a psychological, but a logical activity.
Physicist: I am a little concerned about this. Quantum
mechanics and the Copenhagen interpretation put me on my guard
about the treatment of facts as brute, simple, "sensible to feeling as
to sight." Do positrons exist? Is it a fact that positrons exist or is
it proper only to talk of the concept of a positron? Yet I feel that
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there is matter and a consistency in the nature of the world which
the uncertainty principle does not disturb.
Wrangler: Are not the physicist's facts really mathematical
equations, just algorithms? The physicist's theories merely
correlate the facts with the calculi. Here I see an analogy with the
Student's analysis of law. The objects seen by the Physicist with
experiments are the alpha facts, the theories like that of relativity
or classical mechanics are the aleph facts, and the calculi are the
law.
too -facile, rather like Popper's analogy
Physicist: I think this 'is
to facts and theories and the function of the jury I have described
above.
Student: I think that we have underplayed the part of models
and analogies in science. We have so far ignored the part played by
analogies in formal systems. Did not Wang suggest that
formalisation and isomorphism were but tight uses of the use of
analogy and the comparisons which can be made with our intuitive
ideas and messier concepts? The claim that we need formal identity
to prove a case even in mathematics and logic is perhaps too
strong. For a proof to be rigorous it may be the case that two
calculi should be identical or be isomorphic. But cannot the
standard of proof which we have to use to shew that imaginary
numbers and infinite numbers are numbers suffice to prove the
identity of calculi or that from two calculi certain results or
conclusions may be obtained even if they are not isomorphic? So
too with physical theories, cannot we compare models of them
analogously and not isomorphically? This is what I thought some
philosophers of science wished to shew. Isaid before that isomorphism
is merely a formalised analogy. The benefits of formalisation may be
two-fold. Formalisation may sh--ew how rigid, clear, -andeasy are the- points of correspondence between two systems. In a sufficiently rich
system these identities become proofs, even rigorous proofs. But
why should not the comparison of the informal which equally
yields points of contact, comparison, and contrast, be considered
proofs? They may not be formally rigorous, but nevertheless they
may be proofs: not demonstrative reasoning, but plausible
reasoning. After all, in courts of law we argue these matters every
day.
Metaphysician: Certainly it is odd to talk of "proof,"
"shew," with reference only to induction and
"establish,"
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deduction. A proof need not owe its strength to the links of a chain
nor the length of a lever, it may be like the legs of a chair and
support the conclusions. Conclusions may be derived from
premises, they may be established by the cases or they may be
supported by the premises. A rule we do well to remember is as
strong as the cases which support it. We have noticed that peculiar
questions cannot be proved by deduction nor by induction, yet it
would be strange, even perverse, to say that we cannot prove them.
"Is this a cow?" "Is this negligence?" "Is this a number?" "Is
this a proof?"; these fall to be decided paraductively.
Student: A proof of evidence in a brief may relate to the
establishment of alpha facts. A statement in a book on pleading or
evidence, which tells us that in order to succeed in a case of
trespass there must be proof that the plaintiff was in possession,
concerns an establishment of aleph facts. I may have proved that
the accused was not guilty (1) by shewing that on the night of June
the first the accused was ten miles from the scene of the crime in
Enfield committing adultery, when the accused was a monk; or (2)
that killing is not murder in that the accused was insane; or (3) the
accused was not guilty in that what was alleged in the indictment
constituted no crime by shewing that adultery is no crime in
English law though under the lex Julia adulteriis it was in Roman
Law. These are different sorts of proofs.
Metaphysician: Quite so. There are other cases in which it is
natural to say of someone that he proved something. Freud proved
the existence of the Unconscious; Proust proved the existence of
Love; Russell sought to shew that a mathematical proof must be
perspicuous; Gauss proved that imaginary numbers were numbers,
and so on.
Student: Again, in law we can establish a rule, prove a
proposition, declare a rule of law. What we do is also said to
follow sometimes inexorably, sometimes ineluctibly, sometimes of
necessity. Are these euphemisms only psychological explanations of
our procedures? Or is it the case that we use language naturally?
Before a case is over we often feel that it was doubtful whether the
accused was guilty, but now we are sure. We have gained a grasp of
the facts and acquired a further understanding. I should also want
to add we have acquired new knowledge. This is epistemological,
not psychological merely.
Metaphysician: It is quite true that we must distinguish between
epistemological questions and psychological questions. We must
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distinguish between the questions how can we know and how do we
know. Now what I want to ask here is the status of proof. Is it a
can or do word? Why is a rigorous proof in any different position
from an ordinary proof or an inductive proof? Is it in shewing us
what we can know?
Wrangler: I do not know that it is not one way to know and so
one way to prove that "An even number is always representable by
the sum of two primes by running serially through the even
numbers and decomposing each into primes." How did Aristotle
find the syllogism? From arguments and patterns of plausible
reasoning, then making rules about them. Of course there is a point
that we cannot know intuitively all the prime numbers, or whether
the number series is infinite. If the number series is infinite then
there is no end to the number of even numbers and no end to the
number of primes, so how can we know? It is a conceptual question
we are considering. But will deduction answer our questions any
better? As Wang again pointed out, there was a vain hope that
when set theory was developed we would be able to answer
foundational problems that arise in mathematics analytically. This
turns out a vain belief. Foundational studies remain epistemological,
and they are philosophical riddles not merely mathematical or
logical problems.
Metaphysician: Quite so. This is what I have been trying to
shew vis a vis all argument and knowledge.
Student: Yes. This is what I wish to shew as- well. What I had
in mind in shewing that so clearly a paraductive subject as the law
was calculus-like, and so like mathematics and logic, was really a
perverse way of shewing how mathematics and logic were
themselves like the law, and how the fundamental and deep and
foundational problems of both mathematics and logic resolved
themselves into epistemological questions and were dissolved, if
they were dissolved, by philosophical argument and analysis.
Metaphysician: Analysis is not a word I am too happy with.
This smacks too much of the logico-deductive. The ultimate
arguments in philosophy as in law, science, mathematics, logic,
history, ethics and so on, are paraductive in your phrase, or case by
case.
Student: Yes. I further attempted to shew that science was like
law, history like law, the decisions of questions of fact like law,
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that is aleph facts; and so there were resemblances between all these
which shewed that all knowledge when studied in particularity, little
by little, would yield the tale that all reasoning and all knowledge is
derived from reasoning, and all knowledge is derived from
reasoning which is paraductive, although there may be areas in
which it is appropriate to talk of a priori, empirical, analytic,
synthetic, necessary, contingent and so on. What is achieved by
Polya is the doubting of the primacy of deduction in mathematics,
what is strewn by Hesse is the doubting of the primacy of
mathematical interpretation of physical data on the one hand and
the primacy of the inductive claim that the facts must be the same
before they can be thought of as particulars which yield general
laws.
Metaphysician:Quite so. But neither sees in the use of cases the
ultimacy of the ultimate argument; that ratiocination which lawyers
have used as the supreme and final argument. It is the argument
with which and by which counsel at the bar plead sometimes the
general rule and its deduction from it when there is a point of law
in issue, and at others how they refute inferences from the facts
when an alpha fact is sought to be proved by evidence, whether it is
the testimony of a witness or the proof of documents which are
cases in which it would be appropriate to talk of induction. Finally
it is used by judges when they sum up before, or direct a jury as to
matters of aleph facts; that is, where it is usual to speak of fact and
theory, reality and interpretation, but where a metaphysician like
myself talks of matters of fact, question of fact. These foundational
questions are in effect the raising of conceptual matters. How can
we know an X? What is the nature of truth? What is the nature of
proof?
Wrangler: Or what is the nature of number, infinity,
mathematical identity and so on?
Student: Or what is the nature of law, what is the nature of
justice right and wrong?
Metaphysician: Yes. These questions used to be talked of in the
context of universals, or Plato's theory of forms, or Aristotle's
essences. They revolve around the idea that we can give the
sufficient and necessary conditions of an X or a cow or law.
Student: You would want to say that they are really the
relations which are contained in Wittgenstein's notion of family
resemblances, the interweaving, intertwining, criss-crossing,
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overlapping of features that are common to some instances but not
to others and certainly not to all with th features that others share
with others but not with some and so on.
Metaphysician: Quite so. And these features are drawn out by
paraduction by shewing cases where it would be appropriate to give
such and such a description which corresponds to another
description where the cases are analogous: "This is a swan;" "This
is a number;" whether the number is rational, imaginary or
infinite; "This is negligence;" "This is a positron or an atom or an
element or a molecule or a particle;" or "This is real;" or "This is
the unconscious" where we are talking of minds and so on.
Physicist: But I consider that the concept of a positron as the
concept of quanta is a logical and not an empirical matter. The
class of incontrovertibly true statements includes at least two kinds
of different assertions: those such that their denials are selfcontradictory, and those which are such that their denials, although
consistent, describe nothing intelligible to think about. "All
bacholors are male" is true in sense (1). "All bachelors weigh less
than the sun" is true in sense (2). "No triangle is quadrilateral" is
incontrovertibly true in sense (1). "No Beta particles or precisely
determined energy can have precisely determinable co-ordinates" is
true in sense (2). It may be that the suggested permanence of this
last concept derives not from any positive conviction that there is a
consistently intelligible alternative but from alternative views of
demonstrable inconsistency' There is as yet no algebraically
detailed, or an experimentally adaptable, answer to Heisenberg's
challenge. Nothing in the past or present utterances of Born,
Feyerabend and Vigier can claim here and now to be a working
alternative. It is not enough just to note that since science evolved,
this principle may change with it, for this is to note no more than
physics is a body of empirical knowledge, and not a formally
closed algorithm. No physical theory is incontrovertibly true in
sense (1). Who would deny this? Not even Eddington at the zenith
of his a priorism. Parts of our physical thinking however may now
be incontrovertibly true in sense (2). Again, this is a conceptual
formula, not a psychological one. That X is not thinkable is not
another experimental datum. This affects everything that
philosophers can say about X and its context. To say we do not
know what a perpetuum mobile would, be like is not like saying we
do not know now what Venus's surface is like. Thus recognising
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that a physical theory and its interpretation is never final qua
logically closed is not the same as recognising, in addition, well
developed alternatives of that theory, and of then asking which
alternative is true.
Wrangler: This distinction between what is logically possible
and what is pragmatically possible is important. I can give
examples of abandoned proofs in mathematics; I can give examples
of things which were said to be proofs, accepted as proofs, but
which were not. They turned out to be false. I may have to dig
them out from the limbo in which the obsolete and the false now
rest. What are we to say of them?
Student: Yes, and what of cases in law that have been
overruled, statutues repealed, judgments said to be false? When we
think on .these things and the connections with mathematics and
logic which we have already discussed, the open-endedness of logic
and mathematics, the effect of Godel's theorem, the liar paradox,
the problems of foundational studies, the use of formalism and
isomorphism and its relations with analogy, what is contained in
following a rule, what is a rule, a proof, truth, and so on, we are
left with little of so-called rigour in deductive logical systems. Little
more that is than there is in induction and paraduction as arguments
which prove.
Wrangler: Yet we do see differences.
Student: And likenesses.
Metaphysician: But what do these differences and likenesses
shew? Do they prove anything? What have we gained after our
discussion and how does that differ from what we knew before?
Student: We do not need to know everything to know
something.
Metaphysician: Tout comprendre c'est tout pardonner,
overstates the case.
Student: Yes, and in the law witnesses must tell the truth, the
whole truth and nothing but the truth. To do this is no easy matter.
It is a recondite, intricate, complicated process in which both
counsel and judge have their separate roles, in which they ask
questions, make inferences, relate facts one to another, discuss
probabilities, argue the law, and so on. These difficulties are present
whether the facts are microscopic or macroscopic. The physicist
concerned with microscopic phenomena is inclined to consider that
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his problems are conceptually and logically different from
macroscopic phenomena. If this is so in physics it need not be so in
finding alpha facts in law. How to relate the account of one
observer with that of another may involve a theory of relativity, just
as the physicist concerned with the problems of macroscopic and
celestial motion needs an Einstein to resolve the metaphysical
problems which arise in accounts of space and time. The observer
from the moving train sees the falling apple differently from the
observer standing on the railway line. To the former the fall
describes a straight line, to the latter a parabola. To connect
different accounts, to relate different lines of authority requires
interpretation, comparison, and distinction. To see them and to
shew them requires an understanding. Understanding requires
argument. This is a facility as much concerned with following an
argument as recognising a picture when it is a work of art, or the
potentialities of a horse when it is to be handicapped. Such an
ability and an activity employs in the manifold difficulties of a
legal case the use of induction, deduction, paraduction. However,
the processes of reasoning which might be used must not obscure
the fact that one procedure alone ultimately supports other logics,
that of deduction and induction. The place paraduction has in
reasoning seems to me like the place Scheffer's stroke has in logic.
The price we may pay for abandoning in practice deduction and
induction may be too large to pay for metaphysical truth, but the
law in its own way, and metaphysics in its ultimate way, must pay
the price when we are asking about ultimate reasoning-an answer
to the question "What is truth?" when it is the truth about reasons
and knowledge.
Wrangler: I have heard much about paraduction, but what is it
about this procedure, ratiocination, informal logic, ultimate
argument, that is binding, forceful, compelling?
Student: Well, what is there compelling about following a rule
in mathematics, being convinced by a proof and so on? These
questions are related to foundational questions. They are questions
about the fundamentals in disguise. We have shewn how the law
and logic are related, interconnected, where they fit and square and
where they are to be distinguished and so on. These seem to be
fundamental to this question.
Wrangler: But do you think that the examination in detail,
microscopically, of legal argument will reveal how the case by case
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procedure is binding, how paraduction does convince? There has
been much talk of the use of analogy, but what is the use of
analogy?
Student: I have given examples of the use of paraduction and
shewn how we can derive rules paraductively, how we can establish
a part of our legal calculus paraductively, and I have argued that
by proving part of our system to be consistent we can, as in
mathematics and logic, shew how the whole is consistent. This is
done in no small degree by the putting and countering of cases.
Wrangler: Yes, but what is the case?
Metaphysician: What can be usefully said about cases? How do
they work in our language game? What.role do they play in our
calculus? The Wrangler's question must be answered as we would
answer questions about time or number. Time may be blind
continuum, a category, a coordinate, and so on; yet it may be that
which is older than time, counted by chronometers and different
from time counted by anxious, worried women lying awake; it may
be older than generations. We have learned that it is not absolute.
It is not a measuring rod counted by clocks or sundials or even
dandelions; it may be relative to some observed phenomena
simultaneously recorded by different observers. Now this informal
account of time may also be used to shew that number is not the
rigid mathematical entity of arithmetic only, but it may be related
to music and poetry as"in the way we talk of "tell me not in
mournful numbers," etc. So too, cases must not be confined only
to legal cases. We must be careful to distinguish between cases as
used in induction, and in mathematical induction, and in deduction.
The cases I have in mind are like legal cases and not like cases in
induction or in mathematical induction. They are cases both actual
and possible. They are cases deciding non-necessary questions of
fact by reflection alone. They are distinguishable from induction in
that subsequent testing, experimenting, looking, will not reveal any
further facts or information, relations or constructs. It is as if all
the evidence is in and yet there still remains a doubt.
Physicist: What do you hope to get out of the cases?
Metaphysician: I can tell you what I do not get out of the
cases. I do not get out of the cases an inductive argument or a
relationship which is causal. I do not get, this is a case of Cl, this
is a case of C2, this is a case of C3, . . . this is a case of Cn, so
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this is a law: all C's are Gammas. I do not relate the argument
causally in the way in which smoking and lung cancer are
related-that is, relating two conceptions. I am concerned with
deriving from the cases: "Is the case of Cl a case of C?" "Is this
case of C2 a case of C?." when we are deciding something of the
sort: "What is the nature of C?."
Physicist: Yes, this is indeed what is mystifying me. I
understand that the law uses paraduction to decide whether cases of
nuisance and cases of negligence are cases of tort. I also
understand that paraduction is used to compare and contrast cases
of contracts where there is no consideration with cases of equitable
estoppel, thus shewing that contracts where there is no supporting
consideration can be used as shields to an action, as defences.
Student: Yes, this is the case. There are others too. This is how
Maitland describes the building of the doctrines of estates and can
talk of the doctrine as establishing a calculus projected upon the
plane of time.
Physicist: Quite so. The Student also suggests that paraduction
is analogous to the use of models and analogy in science. Now
some accounts given by philosophers of science seem to 'support
this view. Not all philosophers of science dismiss analogy as a mere
use. What is unclear now is whether the metaphysician in drawing
the distinction between cases and induction has diverged from his
agreements with the Student about the role cases play in argument,
the nature of cases and what it is we want out of them.
Student: I want the cases to present an analogy. I do not
subscribe to the sophisticated view of some common law lawyers that
all we can compare in a case are the rationes decidendi, and that the
doctrine of precedents and the stare decisis rule apply only to the
rationes decidendi of cases. Although in a way this formulation of
the doctrine of precedents brings out a feature of how we use cases,
we do not use the bare brute facts of one case and compare and
contrast them to those bare brute facts of other cases. We do not
use alpha facts of case I as points of contract, comparison,
contrast, identity, equivalence, etc. with alpha facts of case 2. There
is a well known way of deciding cases where the facts of the instant
case are on "all fours" with the facts of a case which is a
precedent. Where the instant case and the precedent cannot be
distinguished, then the precedent, if it is an authority within the
hierarchy, must be followed. The precedent is binding or persuasive.
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We talk like this where the cases cannot be distinguished "on the
facts" as the forensic expression goes. What is more often done, and
what seems to me of interest to consider, is that part of the judicial
process where aleph facts are used as the point de rattachement.
Where the aleph facts contain the analogies, fact and interpretation
constitute the analogy. This is not "loosely putting cases without
laying any foundation of a ground or difference or reason" and
"being put so scattered prove not" of which Bacon complains.
Physicist: Are you suggesting that Bacon's use of cases in legal
writings and his new induction have a similarity?
Student: Yes, I think that this is clearly seen in Bacon's
epistemology when we compare legal, philosophic, scientific, and
historical writings. His insistence on particulari and finding from
particulars, hidden axioms, such as the quiddities of heat, from
which to induce higher axioms, is comparable with his desire to
obtain the leges legum from the placita legum.
Physicist: This is interesting for what I want to shew is that the
use of analogies and models in science have some analogy and
point here. First, let me say that I was struck by the aleph fact and
alpha fact dichotomy and I wonder whether the following
procedure would not be too remote from what the law does in these
matters. Consider the superficially observable similarities between
waves of water, light and sound. In all three cases there are present
motion, something transmitted indirectly from one place to another
by hitting an obstacle, and a bending round obstacles. This suggests
that the three processes are perhaps alike in more fundamental
respects and in order to investigate this possibility we should look
more closely at the one of the three about which we know the most,
namely water waves. We postulate with Huygens that distrubance
of one particle communicates with another particle in the same way
a ripple causes disturbances in concentric circles, and by means of
the elementary mathematics for harmonic motion we are able to
represent the amplitude and frequency of the waves and to derive
the laws of reflection and refraction. From this mathematical
theory some rules of the process such as the quality of the angles of
the incidence of refraction can be deduced. So far we have two
sources of information to aid our constructions of theories for
sound and for light-their observed properties and their observed
analogies with water waves, and it is important to notice that both
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of them appeal only to descriptions of "observable" events. We
may define observation statements as those descriptive statements
whose truth or falsity in the face of given empirical circumstances
would be agreed upon by all users of English with or without scientific
training. Let us also introduce the term "explicandum"
for the set of observation statements connected with the phenomena
we are attempting to explain by means of the theory, in this case
the observed properties of sound or of light. All users of English
might not of course notice the analogies between the three processes
until they are pointed out, and up to this point they may have had
no more significance than the fact that the fingers on the hand and
the petals on a buttercup are similar in that they both have only
five members. But where the analogies have been pointed out, no
esoteric insight and no specifically scientific knowledge is required
in order to recognise that they exist. It is not quite the same with
the mathematical theory of water waves, for here some knowledge
of trigonometry is required. But there is no difficulty in
understanding the terms "height of water," "frequency of waves,"
etc., into which the mathematical symbols are interpreted. In this
sense the mathematical system is "about [has its interpretation in
terms of] observable events.' '1 2 Even at this level of development of
a theory of analogy and models, we find that the analogy consists
in some sort of hidden features which physical objects possess and
observation reveals. In Bacon's language, we find the hidden or
latent qualities, not the simple forms. We shall see that when we
construct analogies out of models we do so not to notice as the
result of observation or experiment that particular states of affairs
obtain, but that we may construct hypotheses out of the analogies.
The analogy supports a theory rather than describes facts. In this
view of science, the interest lies in the confirmation of hypotheses
rather than in proving facts by induction. Of course the description
of similarities and differences between two analogues is a fairly
inaccurate, incomplete, and inconclusive procedure. Although we
often feel some confidence in asserting the existence of a similarity
and that some things are more similar to each other than to other
things, we cannot usually locate discrete characteristics in one
object which are positively and finally identifiable with, or
differentiable from, those in another object. Still," the inconclusive
12 M. HESSE, MODELS AND ANALOGIES IN SCIENCE

149 (1963).
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nature of the procedure is not fatal because we are not looking for
incorrigible inductive methods, but only for methods of selecting
hypotheses. Analogical argument is usually quite inconclusive, both
for the usual inductive reasons and also because it may rest on
incomplete implication or similarities. Nevertheless, as will be
argued, it does present a method of hypothesis selection which is
justified on at least some of the recognised criteria for such
selection. We shall also see that even if it were possible actually to
weigh the similarities between the explicandum and different models
which are compared with it, this would not strengthen the
analogical arguments according to any of its acceptable
justifications, and so it is pointless even to seek to define the degree
of similarity among the sets of characters. Polya tries to give a
formalised account of patterns of plausible reasoning by using the
logic of induction."
Metaphysician: This brings out part of what I am suggesting.
"How can we know?" is answered by the Physicist: "By the
present use of analogies and models." Thus we can use analogies
and models to discover hypotheses. In the similarities we see certain
relations which hold. Here at least there is some likeness to my
description of the case by case procedure. Where we differ is this:
How does a scientist proceed when he has discovered a hypothesis?
He wishes to confirm it or establish it. He then proceeds by
experiment. He looks. A metaphysician cannot look except
metaphorically. He can only think, reflect, cogitate, animadvert.
He has no procedure open but to reflect upon what is already
before him and is contained in the cases.
Student: And the lawyer too, the judge and the jury are in this
position when they consider aleph facts or when the judge has to
decide a question of law.
Metaphysician: It would never be right to say that a conceptual
matter, a logical matter, was proved by subsequent experiment or
observations. The facts can never prove a logical puzzle. Logic is
independent of life, the facts, what is the case.
Physicist: Yet people say that Einstein's theory of relativity was
proved by subsequent observation of certain astronomical
phenomena.
Metaphysician:Only as a physical theory. Insofar as our concept
of space and time as subsistent separate coordinates have been
" .

60

POLYA. PATTERNS OF PLAUSIBLE INFERENCE
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(1954); see Hesse, On Defining Analogy,

79-100 (1959).
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changed by Einstein, neither physics nor astronomy affect this
metaphysical claim. Einstein was explicit about this in the
Princeton lecture. Hence the aphorism already mentioned. "So far
as mathematics relate to reality, they are uncertain. So far as they
do not relate to reality, they are certain."
Student: And the law in this regard is like logic, mathematics,
metaphysics. The facts and the events of the external world are
merely the occasions for our reflections and concepts. Reality has
only a casual connection with logic, neither causal nor logical. The
claim is sometimes made that we cannot see these similarities and
distinctions informally. However the history of English law shews
that judges can and do reconcile and distinguish, without the aid of
any formal system of logic or mathematics, or indeed any logic of
induction. What is mystifying the claim that we cannot see, is the
vagueness or ambiguity of the word "see," a. word having
overtones of observation, experiment, test, measure, and so on. In a
sense it has empirical and inductive overtones. "Seeing," however,
is used metaphorically and really imports the- notions of
classification and individuation, reconciling and distinguishing.
These are not psychological but philosophical concepts. They are
fundamental to the concept of mind, thought, and action. Some
technique, some artificial process, some formal system, may help us
to see more easily and quickly. It is not the case that without the
formalisations that mathematicians and logicians talk of, we
cannot see. I would rather say that without the formalisations it is
not the case that we cannot individuate and classify or that we
cannot distinguish and reconcile. The technique of ratio decidendi is
a judicial way of giving us a technique to make us ready lawyers,
precise lawyers. By ratio decidendi we have a facility, not a faculty,
a capability not a capacity. The rationes decidendi of cases may
represent the latent qualities in the simple form's or, in Bacon's
language, the middle axioms derived from the first axioms. This is
the element of hypothesis and the facts.
Wrangler: Theory is inseparable from science. Is the Student
now conflating middle axioms, hypotheses in science, with aleph
facts?
Student: No. Aleph facts are pastiches and melanges of law and
fact which a jury decides. Ratio decidendi is something like the
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statement of the judge in the Case of Thorns: "and the reason for
all these cases is that he who is injured ought to be recompensed
''14

Physicist: A philosopher of science would explain analogies
insofar as they relate to induction, and analogies insofar as they
relate to the mathematical theories with which a scientist is
concerned, in these terms. The discussion following, which consists
of quotation from Hesse, brings out the Metaphysician's distinction
between analogies which illustrate a causal connection, and those
where the argument from parallels is intuitive induction and
mathematical induction.
Thirdly and finally, if we regard as valid the argument by analogy and

models as essentially a transfer of causal relations between characters from
one side of the analogy relation to the other, it follows that the
interpretation of theoretical terms we have just given is presupposed in the

argument, even if not explicitly referred to. For if there is a theory about the
causal relations in model two, then the same theory holds for the relevant
characters in model one, and hence for the explanatory theory being sought.
To summarize the discussion so far; we have found some distinction between
formal and material analogy to be crucial to the predictive use of scientific
models, and in this chapter material analogy has been characterised by two
types of dyadic relation, those of similarity and causality. Analogical
arguments from formal models have been formulated in terms of characters

which are independently observable but not also experimentally
separable. .

.

.In connection with the justification of analogical arguments

a distinction has been made between the logical problems of justifying
inference from similarity and the causal problem of deciding whether the

type of vertical relation implied in the analogy is acceptable as causal for
either or both the analogues. Finally the meaning of theoretical terms has

been elucidated in terms of the analogy relation defined."

Metaphysician: When the Student talks of analogy and
compares legal cases with Wang's suggestion that formalisation
and isomorphism are the application of the method of analogy
"used here," he is drawing to our attention that there is a logical
relation between sitilia and similibus, between case and case. He is
not using a causal connection, but a logical relation.
Student: Yes. This is why I suggest that the distinction between
alpha facts and aleph facts is important. The doctrine of precedents
is built upon the comparing and contrasting of aleph facts. Very
rarely indeed are alpha facts used in paraduction. These, I have
said before and reiterate now, are cases which are said to be on all
fours with another case. While it is true that some cases are
'

75 Eng. Rep. 1079 (K.B. 1543).

'
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decided like this, they are generally uninteresting. They are
appropriately spoken of as cases turning upon the facts..Lawyers
do not treat such cases as having a ratio decidendi. Evdn on the
traditional analysis of ratio decidendi lawyers are concerned with
aleph facts and rules of law. This again seems to me another
argument which brings out the logical features of the law, and
supports my calculus theory of law.
Wrangler: There are writers who say that every case has a ratio
decidendi.
Student: Yes, but I think that this is mistaken. There are cases
where the law is known but the alpha facts are in doubt. The judge,
though more often the jury, decides what are the alpha facts, either
on the balance of probabilities in a civil action or beyond all
reasonable doubt in a criminal case. When these alpha facts are
known, no difficulty arises in applying the law. Such cases
frequently occur in the construction of holograph wills and cases in
the criminal courts where the question is "Did Vacquier put the
poison in the bottle of salts?" "Did the defendant publish the
words complained of?" "Was the claimant really Tichbourne?"
These are not questions of law. No citing of authors will help.
Wrangler: In the Case of Thorns which the Student cited, the
judge cites the facts of cases, which are compared. These look like
alpha facts; I lop fallows and stop up a stream and I unwittingly
hit another with my staff, etc., etc. Here the judge says: "And the
reason for all these cases is that he who is damaged ought to be
recompensed." Surely this is declaring a rule of law directly from
alpha facts. We are deriving a general rule from Bacon's simple
forms, or his first axioms. It seems to me that this is a case of
induction by enumeration only. There are jurisprudents, among
them American Realists and Scandinavian Realists, who talk of
law as facts and consider that the law is inductively established by
observation of the facts. For example, Cook says:
In the conclusion that a court never enforces foreign rights, but only rights
created by its own law, I see nothing extraordinary. Indeed, if we examine
into the meaning of the terms 'law' and 'right' as they are commonly used
by judges and lawyers, I think we shall conclude that this way of stating the
matter is the only satisfactory way. For we as lawyers, like the physical
scientists, are engaged in the study of objective physical phenomena. Instead
of the behaviour of electrons, atoms, or planets, however, we are dealing
with the behaviour of human beings. As practicing lawyers we are

interested in knowing how certain officials of society-judges, legislators,
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and others-have behaved in the past, in order that we may make a
prediction of their probable behaviour in the future. Our statements of the
'law' are therefore 'true' if they accurately and as simply as possible
describe the past behaviour and predict the future behaviour of these societal
agents. A statement, for example, that a certain 'rule of law' is the 'law of
England' is therefore merely a more or less convenient shorthand way of
saying that, on the basis of certain observations of past phenomena, we
predict certain future behaviour of the appropriate English officials.'

How does the Student maintain the value of his distinction and
the importance of the distinction between alpha and aleph facts in
view of this approach?
Physicist: Indeed, when the Student suggests that there is no
difficulty in seeing the similarities and differences between analogies
or cases, he can hardly deny the validity of the argument from
simple enumeration only. Even Bacon's argument arising from the
counter-instance is not available, for there are no counter-examples
or instances which are fatal to Aristotle's argument, for he was
dealing with the repetition of the same cases. In the case of analogy
where there are similarities not identities, likenesses not
equivalences, it would be begging the question to assert that such
and such are like, but not identical, similar but not equivalent,
analogous but not isomorphic.
Student: But this is precisely the argument why aleph facts
alone will do. The Case of Thorns looks like the list of alpha facts
from which we can induce a rule. However, it is a sort of index of
type situations: the staff could have been a rifle butt or a mace or a
club; the reeds could have been effluent of a chemical nature; a
dead duck and so on. Then the reason given for the decision is not
a causal but a logical account of what holds between the examples
given by the judge.
Metaphysician:It is tempting to say that we already know what
is material or relevant about the alpha facts which enables the
judge to put the case as he did.
Wrangler: Well, one is tempted to say that the rule is prior to
the right or the remedy, not merely temporally, but logically prior.
One is tempted to say that the rule, whether it is of logic,
mathematics or law is prior to the cases, and that what we do is to
subsume the cases under the rule.
Metaphysician: But this is heresy-worse, it is a muddle. After
all the Student argued in logic and the law in order to shew how
"W.
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formalised systems, with their rules, laws and so on, also depended
on the cases actual and possible.
Student: All we have to do is to leave the argument for a
minute or two, bring up some other argument, as here when the
inductive argument is brought up, for us to fall back on the old
ideas. Because the law shares so many features with mathematics
and logic, the Physicist asserts that it must be deductive if it is not
inductive. Then because the law is shewn not to be deductive, it is
said it must be inductive. It is almost tempting to say that the law
is just law, that legal statements are just legal statements, that
paraduction is just paraduction.
Wrangler: But if the rules depend upon the cases and you know
which cases are which, how do you know which rules are which?
Physicist: If you know which cases are which, why is it not the
case that the cases depend upon the rules? Why should the words
and "the reasons for all these cases is . . ." be construed as the
Student has done? Why should not the reason precede the cases?
Student: If it is asserted that the rule precedes the cases how
does the argument proving this proposition proceed? Do we appeal
to a general law or Universal rule? If so, what is this rule? If we do
not appeal to a gereral rule, which says in terms that all rules
precede cases, then to what do we appeal? I suppose to rules which
illustrate that in Rule I the rule precedes the cases, and that in
Rule n the rule precedes the cases. Now what sort of argument is
this? Are we to run serially through all rules and thus shew that the
rule is that rules always precede cases. This is an inductive
argument which cannot. prove a logical point. Perhaps the matter
can be proved deductively but then we have to establish the
premises or axioms, and this is the question at issue.
Metaphysician: The way to proceed from this point is to find
out what is the nature of the question. If it is a philosophical
matter I suggest that we can proceed by way of the case by case
procedure. We are not here concerned with a causal question but
with a logical enquiry. Induction will not do. We may try to prove
the general rule by shewing that all cases of rule 1 precede the
cases, and all cases of rule 2 precede the cases, that all cases of rule
3 precede the cases, for all cases from rule I to rule n. This proof
however would not be the application of the rule but the case by
case procedure. Thus we could establish the rule that all rules
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precede the cases only from cases of rules preceding cases
themselves. This is paraduction par excellence.
Student: And this is analogous to claims logicians make about
how the rules of inference are derived from formal analogy. It is
analogous to arguments mathematicians use when they use
mathematical induction.
Wrangler: I suppose that you argue that this conclusion can be
established informally in the law.
Student: Yes.
Wrangler: With reference to Shelley's Case and other cases
which establish rules, cases like Wild's Case,7 Whitby v. Mitchell, 8
Spencer's Case, 9 Tulk v. Moxhay, 0 Royal Bank v. Turquand,21
24
Purefoy v. Rogers,22 Sibley v. Perry,23 Andrews v. Partington,
Pinnel's Casel and so on. There are many of them.
Student: Quite so. There are lines of authorities which can be
compared and contrasted. Denning J. did this in the High Trees
Case,8 where he noticed that the cases upon equitable estoppel
resembled cases of contract unsupported by consideration.
Wrangler: Yes. What does this do to the axiom-theorem claim?
Suppose that the law was so developed that all cases yielded rules
so that the legal calculus was a calculus of rules, would there be
any room for paraduction?
Doctor: Indeed in civil law countries that is what happens when
we have a code.
Student: Yet there are cases cited here as illustrations of the
application and operation of the code. These are persuasive
precedents.
Doctor: Yes, and Leibnitz suggested that there is a reason
behind all this, and a reason worth the notice of logicians.
Student: This does not seem fatal. Theorems may be derived
more formally by deduction from axioms or rules. New occasions
and novel situations will still call for some moves as imaginative as
17 77 Eng. Rep. 277 (K.B. 1599).

42 Ch. D. 494 (1889), appeal dismissed, 44 Ch. D. 85 (1890).
,977 Eng. Rep. 72 (K.B. 1583).
.2141 Eng. Rep. 1143 (Ch. 1848).
21 119 Eng. Rep. 474 (Q.B. 1855), affrd, 119 Eng. Rep. 886 (Ex. 1856).
2185 Eng. Rep. 1181 (K.B. 1670).
32 Eng. Rep. 211 (Ch. 1802).
2429 Eng. Rep. 610 (Ch.1791).
2 77 Eng. Rep. 237 (K.B. 1600).
21Central London Property Trust, Ltd. v. High Trees House, Ltd., [1947] K.B. 130 (1946).
1
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Gauss's or Einstein's move in comparing and contrasting on the
one hand the series of natural numbers and the series of imaginary
numbers by placing both in a Cartesian coordinate, or in
comparing the theorems of relativity physics with those of
Newtonian mechanics and Maxwell's field equations. The operation
may not be the daily practice of the courts but that would not
affect the logic we are considering.
Wrangler: You mean that when deduction fails us, paraduction
will be the last resort of the judges?
Student: Indeed. In the rule-ridden situation described, the
lawyer would behave more and more like the mathematician and
the symbolic logician. Formalisation and isomorphism would play
a greater part in the legal game than cases and informal analogies,
but this would not disturb the logical point which Wang
made-that there is in isomorphism an application of analogy.

